Kagan on U.S. hegemony, balance of power
So this column is way old - from Jan. 15 - but I've had a busy week or two.
Anyway, it's Robert Kagan's monthly column in the Washington Post. He argues that the world is not balancing against U.S. hegemony; it is not performing the balance-of-power shift that "realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now."
My response is that the attempt to balance is happening, militarily and otherwise, but will be a decade or two before actual balance might occur. I say "otherwise" because perhaps power can now be measured in ways other than missile counts.
(Kagan is the author of "Of Power and Paradise," about the US and EU perspectives on power, which I discussed here.)
In his Washpost column, he cites the decline of EU states' defense spending among other data, such as the world still turning the US for guidance and peace treaties (Korea, Palestine).
These are valid points, but perhaps "power" needs a new metric. In the post-Cold War era, (or the globalization era - either term works for this purpose), power doesn't stem only from the barrels of U.S. or Soviet missle silos. Economic pressure is far more influential than it was during the Cold War, so maybe Europe is balancing. And Kagan doesn't give China enough credit, either. He mentions that China isn't a threat now, but when one views what China is working toward, it certainly seems like an attempt at balancing.
He does mention China in this context, which I find interesting, and perhaps the most intriguing nugget of the piece:
The problem for any nation attempting to balance American power, even in that power's own region, is that long before it becomes strong enough to balance the United States, it may frighten its neighbors into balancing against it.
Indeed. But give China - and Europe - 10 or 15 years. Then we'll see.
Anyway, it's Robert Kagan's monthly column in the Washington Post. He argues that the world is not balancing against U.S. hegemony; it is not performing the balance-of-power shift that "realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now."
My response is that the attempt to balance is happening, militarily and otherwise, but will be a decade or two before actual balance might occur. I say "otherwise" because perhaps power can now be measured in ways other than missile counts.
(Kagan is the author of "Of Power and Paradise," about the US and EU perspectives on power, which I discussed here.)
In his Washpost column, he cites the decline of EU states' defense spending among other data, such as the world still turning the US for guidance and peace treaties (Korea, Palestine).
These are valid points, but perhaps "power" needs a new metric. In the post-Cold War era, (or the globalization era - either term works for this purpose), power doesn't stem only from the barrels of U.S. or Soviet missle silos. Economic pressure is far more influential than it was during the Cold War, so maybe Europe is balancing. And Kagan doesn't give China enough credit, either. He mentions that China isn't a threat now, but when one views what China is working toward, it certainly seems like an attempt at balancing.
He does mention China in this context, which I find interesting, and perhaps the most intriguing nugget of the piece:
The problem for any nation attempting to balance American power, even in that power's own region, is that long before it becomes strong enough to balance the United States, it may frighten its neighbors into balancing against it.
Indeed. But give China - and Europe - 10 or 15 years. Then we'll see.
posted by bp at
1:44 PM
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