the increasingly international nature of terrorism
A man was arrested in Zambia this week, suspected of involvement in the July 21 failed London bombings. One might not think the situation so uncommon -- two countries working together in a criminal case. But this case reaches much further than just Zambia and Great Britain.
The suspect is an Indian-born British citizen, who first appeared on the counterterrorism radar in the late 1990s when he allegedly tried to set up a terrorist training camp near Seattle. He had already been to Afghanistan and Pakistan at that point, reportedly having met Osama bin Laden. American authorities stopped tracking him in 2002, though, because they thought he was killed when he went back to Afghanistan to fight.
The plot thickened when he turned up in South Africa recently, and U.S. authorities tried to work with British and South African law enforcement to nab him. After the London bombings, however, an arrest was able to happen -- in Zambia, where the suspect was at that point.
Harron Rashid Aswat can teach us a lot about the increasingly international nature of modern terrorism.
Transnational terror networks are now old news, with American authorities becoming painfully aware of them in the days shortly after Sept. 11, 2001: Financiers in numerous countries; a headquarters that might reside in Afghanistan or Sudan, then move to a new state for if situation dictates; and cells in every corner of the globe, ranging from completely independendent to well-connected. The Global War on Terrorism, already entangled in the gray area between traditional war and crime-fighting, becomes even more logistically thorny because of its transnational nature.
How does state A arrest a suspect it considers to have committed acts of war against said state -- when the suspect is a citizen of state A, but planned or carried out said acts in states B and C, with weapons purchased in state D, and is currently residing in state E? (The scenario with the suspected perpetrator as a citizen of the persuing state is perhaps the most simple. What if state B wants to punish state A's citizen?) The task is challenging enough when all countries are allies, such as NATO members. It becomes more difficult when countries are merely partners, without a security relationship. However, when one state is a member of the "Axis of Evil," such as Iran, the outlook for cooperation is discouraging. Other complicating factors include a weak states such as Nigeria or Somalia, and states which limit their cooperation in the GWOT due to the very real fear of government overthrow, such as Pakistan.
Current international law alone does not explain such situations.
The United States, as the one state that considers itself at "war," has consistently used military options to fight terrorism, even at the objection of other states. The reported 2003 kidnapping of Egyptian citizen Abu Omar by U.S. CIA operatives -- in Milan, without permission or knowledge of Italian authorities -- cannot be justified by international law. That Omar was dropped off in Egypt for interrogation complicates the kidnapping.
notes to myself:
The subject worthy of study is not necessarily international law, but the operations of the terrorist networks. What motivates the moves across borders? Internet communication makes face-to-face meetings rather unnecessary, so what must be done in person?
1. Physically avoiding authorities
2. Training
3. Actual missions/jihad
Then, which states are ideal for these actions? Without becoming an exercise in area studies, an examination of states that frequently appear in all contexts of terrorist hunts would be beneficial. Some examples include the United States, Great Britain, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia. The states could then be grouped by their general relationship to the GWOT. The United States obviously has a different relationship than Sudan. After the basic history/study, substantive questions might be:
1. What is the relationship between each of these states and the United States?
2. What are the relationships between each of the states?
3. How have the relationships shifted during the past 10 years, and particularly since 2002?
This is not finished, but I have to leave work.
The suspect is an Indian-born British citizen, who first appeared on the counterterrorism radar in the late 1990s when he allegedly tried to set up a terrorist training camp near Seattle. He had already been to Afghanistan and Pakistan at that point, reportedly having met Osama bin Laden. American authorities stopped tracking him in 2002, though, because they thought he was killed when he went back to Afghanistan to fight.
The plot thickened when he turned up in South Africa recently, and U.S. authorities tried to work with British and South African law enforcement to nab him. After the London bombings, however, an arrest was able to happen -- in Zambia, where the suspect was at that point.
Harron Rashid Aswat can teach us a lot about the increasingly international nature of modern terrorism.
Transnational terror networks are now old news, with American authorities becoming painfully aware of them in the days shortly after Sept. 11, 2001: Financiers in numerous countries; a headquarters that might reside in Afghanistan or Sudan, then move to a new state for if situation dictates; and cells in every corner of the globe, ranging from completely independendent to well-connected. The Global War on Terrorism, already entangled in the gray area between traditional war and crime-fighting, becomes even more logistically thorny because of its transnational nature.
How does state A arrest a suspect it considers to have committed acts of war against said state -- when the suspect is a citizen of state A, but planned or carried out said acts in states B and C, with weapons purchased in state D, and is currently residing in state E? (The scenario with the suspected perpetrator as a citizen of the persuing state is perhaps the most simple. What if state B wants to punish state A's citizen?) The task is challenging enough when all countries are allies, such as NATO members. It becomes more difficult when countries are merely partners, without a security relationship. However, when one state is a member of the "Axis of Evil," such as Iran, the outlook for cooperation is discouraging. Other complicating factors include a weak states such as Nigeria or Somalia, and states which limit their cooperation in the GWOT due to the very real fear of government overthrow, such as Pakistan.
Current international law alone does not explain such situations.
The United States, as the one state that considers itself at "war," has consistently used military options to fight terrorism, even at the objection of other states. The reported 2003 kidnapping of Egyptian citizen Abu Omar by U.S. CIA operatives -- in Milan, without permission or knowledge of Italian authorities -- cannot be justified by international law. That Omar was dropped off in Egypt for interrogation complicates the kidnapping.
notes to myself:
The subject worthy of study is not necessarily international law, but the operations of the terrorist networks. What motivates the moves across borders? Internet communication makes face-to-face meetings rather unnecessary, so what must be done in person?
1. Physically avoiding authorities
2. Training
3. Actual missions/jihad
Then, which states are ideal for these actions? Without becoming an exercise in area studies, an examination of states that frequently appear in all contexts of terrorist hunts would be beneficial. Some examples include the United States, Great Britain, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia. The states could then be grouped by their general relationship to the GWOT. The United States obviously has a different relationship than Sudan. After the basic history/study, substantive questions might be:
1. What is the relationship between each of these states and the United States?
2. What are the relationships between each of the states?
3. How have the relationships shifted during the past 10 years, and particularly since 2002?
This is not finished, but I have to leave work.
posted by bp at
2:52 PM
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