Book: Of Power and Paradise
This book came out in 2003, so it's not new. But I just read it, so it's new to me. This is what I think.
It's "Of Power and Paradise: America and Europe in the New World Order," by Robert Kagan.
Kagan's argument is that Europe isn't attempting to balance against U.S. hegemony, as traditional balance of power theory suggests, but that Europe has given up the military power struggle altogether. The states have instead invested their faith in international law - hence the "Paradise" in the title.
This premise is applied to the fervor with which Western European states opposed the (largely) unilateral action in Iraq and the American refusal to join the ICC, for example. Mulilateralism and the United Nations are the framework that Europe had hoped the post-Cold-War West would operate within. Recent U.S. actions, then, have been a slap in the face to the new ideal. If the United States doesn't play by the rules, the rules mean a whole lot less.
Kagan's take is interesting, but balance of power still plays a role.
A key point that he doesn't mention is that the shift to "Paradise" only came after European states lost their power.
The European "choice" to give up balance of power wasn't completely a choice; it wasn't as if the mighty uncontested empires of Europe decided to lay down their arms and pick up pens. It was only after two world wars on their territory (destroying France and Germany) and the disolution of the former USSR that Europe decided to get serious about international law.
The same point cannot be made for why Woodrow Wilson decided to push his international organization in the 1920s. But that's another subject.
Back to France and Germany (supposedly) giving up the power struggle after the destruction of their militaries - it's interesting to note that the one Western European military power not totally brought to its knees by the Second World War has been the one most likely to go to war since (England).
And while the total wars and colonial wars hobbled France's military might, that country certainly hasn't given up its nuclear arsenal yet.
I wish I would have read this before I wrote my senior thesis, which ultimately suggested that European states aren't going to cooperate militarily (in the sense of one European Army) any time soon because each of the states (with a few possible exceptions) still values its ability to defend itself more than it trusts a EuroArmy to do it.
I would have been able to work Kagan into my thesis by saying that he adds credibility to my argument that Europe is not on the path to being an actual state. (I believe it won't accomplish a whole lot more than being a new type of regional trade area that also incorporates some legislation, but doesn't require a surrender of national sovereignty as a federation would.)
Kagan and I both believe that the most of the leaders of the states - contrary to what many argue - don't want a European superpower to balance out the United States. Or, perhaps more accurately, they've realized it's too ambitious of a goal, so they've given up on balancing militarily. I primarily write that they aren't willing to make the sacrifices to achieve this (which he does mention), while he primarily writes that they are more interested in solving disputes through treaties and legislation (which I mention).
There's still a power struggle, and of course a concern with American hegemony, but Europeans states are using other means - soft power, such as vetoing the GE/Honeywell merger - to keep America in check. They've been quite successful at this.
Kagan's argument presents a great explanation for recent transatlantic problems - the states of Western Europe have a significantly different perspective from the United States on international conflict. Some of us don't fully appreciate how much mulitlateralism and international law mean to Europeans. However, the European perspective is still affected by balance of power, and BOP will continue to be a real driving force in the European states' foreign policies - even though the states might like to believe that they are beyond military power.
It's "Of Power and Paradise: America and Europe in the New World Order," by Robert Kagan.
Kagan's argument is that Europe isn't attempting to balance against U.S. hegemony, as traditional balance of power theory suggests, but that Europe has given up the military power struggle altogether. The states have instead invested their faith in international law - hence the "Paradise" in the title.
This premise is applied to the fervor with which Western European states opposed the (largely) unilateral action in Iraq and the American refusal to join the ICC, for example. Mulilateralism and the United Nations are the framework that Europe had hoped the post-Cold-War West would operate within. Recent U.S. actions, then, have been a slap in the face to the new ideal. If the United States doesn't play by the rules, the rules mean a whole lot less.
Kagan's take is interesting, but balance of power still plays a role.
A key point that he doesn't mention is that the shift to "Paradise" only came after European states lost their power.
The European "choice" to give up balance of power wasn't completely a choice; it wasn't as if the mighty uncontested empires of Europe decided to lay down their arms and pick up pens. It was only after two world wars on their territory (destroying France and Germany) and the disolution of the former USSR that Europe decided to get serious about international law.
The same point cannot be made for why Woodrow Wilson decided to push his international organization in the 1920s. But that's another subject.
Back to France and Germany (supposedly) giving up the power struggle after the destruction of their militaries - it's interesting to note that the one Western European military power not totally brought to its knees by the Second World War has been the one most likely to go to war since (England).
And while the total wars and colonial wars hobbled France's military might, that country certainly hasn't given up its nuclear arsenal yet.
I wish I would have read this before I wrote my senior thesis, which ultimately suggested that European states aren't going to cooperate militarily (in the sense of one European Army) any time soon because each of the states (with a few possible exceptions) still values its ability to defend itself more than it trusts a EuroArmy to do it.
I would have been able to work Kagan into my thesis by saying that he adds credibility to my argument that Europe is not on the path to being an actual state. (I believe it won't accomplish a whole lot more than being a new type of regional trade area that also incorporates some legislation, but doesn't require a surrender of national sovereignty as a federation would.)
Kagan and I both believe that the most of the leaders of the states - contrary to what many argue - don't want a European superpower to balance out the United States. Or, perhaps more accurately, they've realized it's too ambitious of a goal, so they've given up on balancing militarily. I primarily write that they aren't willing to make the sacrifices to achieve this (which he does mention), while he primarily writes that they are more interested in solving disputes through treaties and legislation (which I mention).
There's still a power struggle, and of course a concern with American hegemony, but Europeans states are using other means - soft power, such as vetoing the GE/Honeywell merger - to keep America in check. They've been quite successful at this.
Kagan's argument presents a great explanation for recent transatlantic problems - the states of Western Europe have a significantly different perspective from the United States on international conflict. Some of us don't fully appreciate how much mulitlateralism and international law mean to Europeans. However, the European perspective is still affected by balance of power, and BOP will continue to be a real driving force in the European states' foreign policies - even though the states might like to believe that they are beyond military power.
posted by bp at
1:05 AM
3 Comments:
I also think Kagan ignores the role of economic power. Although one shouldn't forget that France recently acquired an aircraft carrier, and that European countries still maintain large militaries. So they still have their swords ready.
But I think it's important to realize just how differently the Europeans (but not so much the British) see the concept of law. For most Europeans, law is something that came AFTER a unified state authority was imposed. It gives law a sort of force that doesn't exist in the Anglosphere, where (especially in the US) law was something created out of chaos, the whole liberal idea of a social contract (very different from Rousseau's).
Americans are willing to accept the idea of vigilantism (cowboys, superheroes), of acting against law (civil disobedience), and of arguing for a moral authority that goes beyond law. After all, this country was founded on the basic idea that the people have a right to revolt against government, that laws only exist so far as the people want them, etc. It's an entirely DIFFERENT concept of the rule of law.
Internationally, the Europeans seem to think that we have to believe in laws before they work. Americans want laws to work before we believe in them.
By
Miguel Centellas, at 1:39 PM
I shy away from critquing Kagan as I've not read the full book yet. I do suggest though another (short) book by Robert Cooper called The Breaking of Nations. He has an interesting comparison of EU and US foreign policies that draws a better characterization of the EU focus on transparency through international law as a post-modern approach to security that, I think, gives good perspective on Kagan's thesis.
By
Anonymous, at 9:28 PM
Hey Miguel and Dan, thanks for stopping by.
Miguel - the economic power of the EU is of course huge. The book "United States of Europe" by T.R. Reid is full of examples, from the EU working on unique trade agreements with MERCOSUR and other organizations to the European ownership of many products we think of as American - Random House, Nielsen (ratings), Chrysler, Baskin-Robbins, Miller Lite, etc.
And yes, the European states still do have their militaries, although they've been largely reduced to the equivalent of how the U.S. National Guard used to be before it started being deployed overseas. The French aircraft carrier, like recent Chinese acquisitions, is certainly interesting, though.
The contrasting views of law, as you point out, cannot be understated.
Dan - That's funny you mention Cooper! Kagan cites his book heavily and recommends it. I'll have to check it out, now that you recommend it, too.
By
bp, at 10:40 PM
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